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Abstract:  The Irish Single Electricity Market is establishing how to comply with the 
European Union Target Model. One option is to move away from the regulated 
environment used in the current design and allow generating firms to bid freely in 
the market. This study shows that in 2011, allowing firms to freely compete in 
quantities (Cournot) would have increased prices by 52%, using Irish-specific 
estimates for the price elasticity of demand. When redesigning the market, 
regulators should consider how best to control market power. 
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1 Introduction
Ireland and Northern Ireland are redesigning their wholesale electricity market to comply
with the EU Target Model (SEM, 2014a). Changes in the market design will affect both
wholesale and retail prices. The current market is a mandatory pool market and limits
generators’ strategic behaviour through the Bidding Code of Practice. The regulatory
authorities (the Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland and the
Utility Regulator in Northern Ireland) are considering how to reform the market and
which market power measures to enact.
Delivering electricity efficiently while mitigating market power and encouraging entry
is as important today as when the Single Electricity Market (SEM) was set up in 2007.
In this paper we explore what would happen to wholesale prices if generators were free to
bid strategically. We find that the wholesale electricity price may increase substantially
in the absence of strong policies to mitigate market power.
In the next section we describe the state of the SEM in 2011. Section 3 briefly
explains how bidding strategically can increase prices in the wholesale market. Section 4
introduces the simulation setup using the portfolio mix and level of demand in the SEM
in 2011, with strategic bidding. Section 5 presents and discusses the change in wholesale
prices that could occur and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Single Electricity Market
The SEM currently operates as a mandatory pool system where generators bid their
short-run marginal costs (fuel, carbon, operational and maintenance costs), in line with
the Bidding Code of Practice. Plants are stacked according to their bid, from lowest
to highest and the cheapest plants needed to meet demand in each half hour are dis-
patched. All plants called to generate receive the bid price of the marginal plant, or
the most expensive plant dispatched in each period. All generating plants also receive
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a payment, called uplift, designed to remunerate the marginal plant for any start-up
and fixed generation costs. Generators are also compensated for their availability with
capacity payments. The sum of all these payments is designed to closely approximate
the long run marginal cost of generation. All generators with a capacity over 10MW
must bid into the pool.
In terms of market structure, the SEM market can be characterised as an oligopoly
with a competitive fringe. In 2011 two firms had a capacity share over 10%, as shown in
Table 1, although 3 firms had market shares above 10% (market share numbers include
both wind that bids into the market and smaller wind farms that do not). The largest
firm is ESB, encompassing both ESB-PG –the incumbent in the Republic of Ireland– and
ESB International (ESB-I), followed by AES, which owns the majority of the thermal
plants in Northern Ireland. In 2012 the regulators decided to let ESB bid as an integrated
firm since the Bidding Code of Practice limited market power.1
Table 1: Market share by capacity and generation in the Single Electricity Market, 2011.
Firm Capacity (MW) Capacity Share (%) Gen. share (%)
ESB 3763 34.4 43.7
AES 1830 16.9 11.0
Viridian 1046 9.6 12.4
Endesa 1016 9.3 0.2
Fringe-Thermal 1108 10.1 15.2
Fringe-Renewables 2167 19.8 12.4
Net Imports - - 5.1
Total 10,930 100 100
ESB is sum of ESB-PG and ESB-I. Capacity and market shares include ownership of wind.
Dublin Bay is included in ESB-I’s portfolio, as ESB-I owns 70% of its shares.
Data from SEMO, allislandproject.org, EirGrid, SONI, windpower.net,
In 2011 renewables (mostly wind) accounted for about 27% of total capacity. Table
1 shows a smaller share since some of the wind is included in large firms’ holdings. Wind
can only generate electricity when wind is blowing and has a priority dispatch according
1See http://www.allislandproject.org/GetAttachment.aspx?id=fd2b05ff-b0ee-443d-87db-
01b1ac4fe27a.
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to EU regulation.2 Its marginal cost of production is close to zero, suggesting that when
the wind blows it is always profitable to generate. In practice wind can be considered a
price taker, although it can influence the bidding strategy of firms that own both wind
and dispatchable generation. As the market price increases, all generators, including
wind, obtain higher revenues.
The current design of the SEM limits strategic behaviour by generators. The market
will have to be reformed to comply with the European Target Model by 2016 SEM
(2014a). The Target Model is designed to support the efficient exchange of electricity
across borders. It does not impose a specific market design, although it was developed
based on markets where bilateral contracts are an important component. Examples
include the Nordpool and the British markets.
The challenges facing the new Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM) are sim-
ilar to those tackled, successfully, by the SEM: mitigating market power, delivering
electricity efficiently and encouraging entry. Additionally, the SEM has experienced a
large increase in wind generation, making it more challenging for the system operator to
balance the market. The new market design has not been decided yet (SEM, 2014a,b),
but it is likely to allow generators to offer electricity at prices above marginal cost.
A centrally controlled dispatch can comply with the Target Model and Gorecki (2013)
recommends retaining this key feature of the SEM.
We determine by how much the wholesale price of electricity could increase if gener-
ation companies were free to act strategically.
3 Cournot Competition
This section first discusses why the Cournot approximation is appropriate in this frame-
work, then shows how the wholesale price is affected by the presence of an oligopoly
2EU directive 2009/28/EC.
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competing a` la Cournot with a competitive fringe. Finally, it compares the oligopoly
price to the one arising in perfect competition.
The assumption of Cournot competition, where firms bid the quantities of electric-
ity they will generate in each period, is an approximation. When there are capacity
constraints and demand is rationed efficiently, the Cournot outcome mimics a two step
game where firms choose capacity in stage one and compete in prices (a` la Bertrand) in
stage two (Tirole, 1988). Some of the strong assumptions needed to obtain the Cournot
equilibrium in the two-part game are verified in the case of electricity markets: elec-
tricity is a non-differentiated good, capacities are observable by all, capacity costs are
relatively large and bids are set simultaneously. This explains why the Cournot compe-
tition framework has often been used to analyse outcomes in electricity markets, both
in Europe and the US (see Wolfram, 1999; Bushnell, 2007; Borenstein et al., 1999).
In this section we present a simple example to clarify the relation between the price
determined in a competitive market and the one in Cournot competition. Assume that
there are 2 symmetric firms, each with total cost function Cj , and increasing marginal
costs cj , i.e. c′j(qj) > 0,∀j. To simplify assume: Cj = q2j /2, with marginal cost cj = qj .
We also include fixed capital costs Fj in firms’ profit functions. The firms face a (inverse)
linear demand curve P = a− b ·Q for every period, where P (0) > 0.
There are a number of generating plants that are price takers. They include indepen-
dent power producers with single thermal plants, generators with Combined Heat and
Power (CHP) plants and all the plants that bid in quantities and not prices, such as wind
generators.3. To simplify the analysis, we limit the competitive fringe to 0 marginal cost
producers in the following example. Such producers will offer generation on the market
any time the price is non-negative. The sum of all the price-taking output at time t is
represented by QFt , often called the competitive fringe.
3In this example we assume that all wind generation is part of the fringe. In Appendix B we show
that if wind is owned by a firm that bids strategically, it decreases firms’ optimal quantity. This is also
consistent with the findings in Ben-Moshe and Rubin (2014), who take a slightly different approach
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Each strategic firm j chooses the generation quantity in each period to maximise its
expected profits Πj .
max
qj
Πj = (a− b ·Q) · qj − q2j /2− Fj where Q =
∑
j
(qj) + Q
F (1)
The first order condition for each firm j yields the following equilibrium quantity:4
qj =
a− b ·QF
(1 + 3b)
(2)
With corresponding Cournot equilibrium price:
PC =
(1 + b)(a− b ·QF )
1 + 3b
(3)
The larger the competitive fringe, the lower the equilibrium price will be.
We can compare the price in Cournot with the price that would occur in perfect
competition, where P = MC. In equilibrium MCi = MCj = M¯C and P (qi+qj+Q
F ) =
M¯C:
P ∗ =
a− b ·QF
1 + 2b
(4)
PC is always larger than P ∗.
Forward contracts may also influence the competitive performance of electricity mar-
kets. We address this point later in the paper.
4 Gaming in the SEM
We simulate the market with Energy Exemplar’s PLEXOS5 Integrated Energy Model
which allows generation companies (collections of generators) to act strategically by
withdrawing capacity in order to increase their profits (Nash-Cournot competition). We
4It is easy to verify that the second order condition for a maximum is also met.
5Available online at www.energyexemplar.com
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use the Xpress Mixed Integer Programming solver.6
To implement Nash-Cournot competition, PLEXOS divides demand into multi-period
‘blocks’, calculates the linear demand function in each block and solves the game (the
strategic interaction between firms) independently for each block. Once a game has been
played for each block, this information is passed to the full hourly resolution calculation
and provides prices and generation level. Adjustments are then made to the algorithm
that calculates the outcomes in perfect competition. The price we report for the Cournot
model is the average of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium price which is reported for each
period in 2011, where each hour’s price is weighted by that hour’s electricity generation.
We start from the 2011 PLEXOS model used in (Deane et al., 2014) with historical
fuel and carbon prices and representative start-up and no load costs. Demand is the
historical demand for 2011 net of interconnector flows, as we do not model intercon-
nection. Firms act strategically (i.e. decide what generation level will maximise their
profits) given their generation portfolio. Note that ownership of wind by large firms
changes their incentives, and therefore influences final results. Wind, hydro and biomass
generators not owned by one of the major firms are assumed to be price takers. Peat
plants are taken as a separate category as they have priority dispatch.
Wind capacity ownership in the SEM was determined using information from the
Irish Wind Energy Association (IWEA) website. Where Power Purchase Agreements
were in place between individual turbine owners and these generation companies we
omitted that capacity from the company’s strategic portfolio. Wind not associated with
large companies is deemed non-strategic.
We assume that demand for electricity is elastic to price. If the price of electricity
increases, demand will decrease. The Price Elasticity of Demand (PED) for electricity
in Ireland by sector is taken from (Di Cosmo and Hyland, 2013). It is combined with
the consumption share of electricity by sector from the SEAI National Energy balances7
6FICO Xpress Optimiser, available at http://www.fico.com
7http://www.seai.ie/Publications/Statistics-Publications/Energy-Balance/Previous-
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to form a weighted estimate of the total PED for electricity in Ireland. We assume
that numbers for Northern Ireland would be similar. This calculation is outlined in
table 2 and gives a PED for electricity of e=-0.16 which is consistent with international
estimates (see Table 1 in Fan and Hyndman, 2011).
Table 2: Price Elasticity of Demand by Sector, Ireland.
Sector Consumption PED Wholesale price PED*Share Wholesale
share as a share of PED
retail price
Industrial 38% -0.275 76% -0.105 -0.080
Residential 33% -0.07 55% -0.023 -0.013
Commercial 26% -0.09 55% -0.024 -0.013
Agriculture 2% -0.38 55% -0.009 -0.005
Weighted PED -0.16 -0.11
Consumption share from SEAI National Energy Balances for 2011 (see footnote 7).
Elasticities by sector from Di Cosmo and Hyland (2013).
Using EuroStat data we calculated the wholesale share of final electricity prices. (For
example, wholesale electricity price is 55% of final residential electricity price but is a
much higher share of final electricity cost for industrial users, at 76%). This calculation
suggests that the wholesale PED is e=-0.11.
5 Results and discussion
Table 3 presents the results of our analysis. The Perfect Competition row refers to
a situation where no strategic behavior is allowed and models the SEM in its current
form. The perfectly competitive price in our model picks up only the short run costs
of generating electricity, ignoring the costs of turning plants on and off and paying for
the capital costs. To compare this price with a price that emerges in an energy-only
market, we add the uplift component of e7/MWh and the historical capacity payments,
Energy-Balances/
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equivalent to e16.2/MWh for 2011.8
With a price elasticity of demand of e=-0.11, there is a 52.3% increase in price. We
assume that if firms are allowed to bid strategically, they will not receive any payments in
addition to the energy payments they receive in the market. This finding is in qualitative
agreement with our theoretical results in Section 2.
In addition to controlling how generators are allowed to bid, SEM regulators currently
use ‘directed contracts’. The largest generating firms are forced to sell a certain amount
of their output at a price determined by the regulators. In 2011, the only firm subject
to directed contracts was ESB (SEM Committee, 2010, 2011). We study how this could
affect prices in the Nash-Cournot game in three scenarios: ESB has to sell 10%, 50%
or 100% of its total generation forward. Note that in each of these scenarios, all other
strategic generators bid strategically with 100% of their capacity.
Table 3 shows that the directed contracts on ESB’s generation will not limit market
power significantly when generators are allowed to act strategically in I-SEM, unless
ESB is forced to sell all or most of its generation forward. Of the three directed contract
scenarios, the one where ESB is forced to sell just 10% of its generation forward is closest
to the historical requirement on ESB. When defining the level of directed contracts, the
regulators also determine which directed contracts apply to base-load, mid-merit or peak
loads. In this analysis we do not disaggregate forward contracts by level of demand.
The analysis we presented is based on a static environment. In practice firms also
consider dynamic incentives when bidding. For example, firms might recognise that if
prices greatly increase, there is a risk of regulatory intervention or new firms may find
it profitable to enter the market.
The results reported in this table also assume that imports along the interconnector
will not increase with prices. For 2011 this is a reasonable assumption as interconnection
to the SEM was limited to the Moyle interconnector. Moreover, it was on complete
8Capacity payments are paid out to generators on a per MW basis. Here we present the average
effect per MWh to facilitate comparisons with the energy only price.
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Table 3: Summary of results comparing perfect competition to Cournot competition
with price elasticity of demand e=-0.11
Scenario Price (e/MWh) % change
Perfect Competition 76.01
(includes uplift and capacity payments)
All Companies 100% Strategic 115.74 52.3
ESB 10% of generation forward 115.39 51.8
ESB 50% of generation forward 108.04 42.1
ESB 100% of generation forward 70.12 -7.7
outage from the 24th of August to the end of the year.
History has shown that electricity prices can exceed perfect competition levels signif-
icantly. In Great Britain (GB), electricity generation was privatised in 1990 and moved
to a market-based system. Wolak and Patrick (2001) show that the generators withheld
capacity in certain half-hour periods, driving up the pool price. Wolfram (1999) shows
the higher prices didn’t quite reach Cournot predictions, while remaining significantly
higher than in perfect competition. In a dynamic setting firms may restrain prices to
discourage entry of new competitors or to limit potential increases in regulation.
A recent study Deane et al. (2014) found that in the current GB market, with
vertically integrated firms and bilateral contracts, firms appear to underprice wholesale
electricity and recover their profits in the retail segment. This behaviour limits entry
into the wholesale market.
6 Conclusion
Controlled bids in the SEM were set up to avoid abuses of market power in a market
that displayed an oligopolistic structure. The simulations presented in this paper show
that moving away from a model with controlled bids to one with strategic behavior will
increase wholesale electricity prices.
The implementation of the Target Model in the SEM should prioritise the need to
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control market power and strategic behaviour. The challenge will be to use the flexibility
inherent in the Target Model’s guidelines to best serve final consumers.
7 Appendix A-Sensitivity Analysis
Below we present a table displaying the results of our PLEXOS simulation with elasticity
of -0.16 and with elasticity of -0.3. These results are consistent with what we would
expect: the lower the elasticity the more power the generation companies have to set
market price so we get dramatically higher prices as e→ 0. Furthermore, as we increase
the value of the elasticity we recover the perfect competition result where prices are set
at marginal cost.
Table 4: Summary of results comparing perfect competition to Cournot competition
with price elasticity of demand e=-0.16 and e=-0.3 . Note that in both scenarios, all
companies act strategically with all of their generation capacity (excluding wind, hydro,
peat and CHP generation plants).
Scenario Price (e/MWh) % change
Perfect Competition 76.01
(includes uplift and capacity payment)
All Companies 100% Strategic, e=-0.16 97.06 27.7
All Companies 100% Strategic, e=-0.3 79.61 4.7
8 Appendix B - Wind ownership and competition
This section shows why ownership of wind affects the incentives of firms that own thermal
plants.
In Equation 1 we presented the profit maximization function of a firm operating as a
Cournot competitor in an environment that has a fringe of price-taking firms, including
wind generators. What happens when some of the wind is owned by firms that bid
strategically? We assume that the marginal cost of wind generation is 0 and that both
generators own wind.
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Suppose each firm generates a quantity of electricity denoted by qj +
qw
2 . The profit
maximizing function for strategic firm 1 becomes the following:
max
q1
Π1 = [a− b · (q1 + q2 + qw + QF0 )] · (q1 +
qw
2
)− q21/2− F1 (5)
and similarly for the symmetric firm 2. Note that the firm cannot choose the amount
of qw since wind generation is not dispatchable. Also, in every period where wind is
available, it will be optimal for the firm to bid it in. This however does not exclude that
wind ownership will affect the optimal quantity of a generator. Because any existing
wind will benefit from higher prices, there is an added incentive to decrease quantity
offered in the market.
Now the competitive fringe generation is QF0 = Q
F − qw, i.e. some of the wind
generation is owned by the strategic firms.
The first order condition (FOC) for maximisation is
q1 = q2 := qˆ =
a− b(32qw + QF0 )
1 + 3b
(6)
As wind generation increases, strategic firms decrease the optimal amount of thermal
generation.
However, recall the Cournot Price function:
PC(qw) = a− b · (q1 + q2 + qw + QF )) := a− b · (2qˆ(qw) + qw + QF0 ).
How does PC vary with quantity of wind owned by a strategic firm? Using compar-
ative statics, we can define the effect on the equilibrium price of a change in qw.
dPC
dqw
= −2b · dqˆ
dqw
− b = −b
1 + 3b
< 0 ∀b > 0. (7)
We compare this to the change in the equilibrium Cournot price when strategic firms
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do not own wind generation. Differentiating equation 3 yields the following:
∂PC
∂qw
=
−b(1 + b)
1 + 3b
(8)
If we compare equation 7 to equation 8, we see that the when wind is owned by
strategic firms the equilibrium price decreases less in the presence of more wind.
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